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A PROCEDURAL REVIEW
OF THE FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT
CLYDE H. BLOEMEER
The 19o8 original version' of the present Federal Employer's
Liability Act contained no special venue provisions; venue was regu-
lated by the general venue provisions of the Judicial Code, which re-
quired the plaintiff to bring his action in the place of residence of the
defendant.2 By amendment in igo and 1911, the plaintiff was given
the choice of three federal districts in which to sue: ".... the district of
the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose,
or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of com-
mencing such action." 3 In the same section it was further provided:
"The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this Act
shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States...."
This expansion of the number of forums in which the action could
be brought relieved the plaintiff of the necessity of going to the resi-
dence of the defendant railroad to sue, but it frequently placed a
corresponding hardship on the defendant, as the plaintiff was often
able to sue the railroad at a considerable distance from the point at
which the cause of action arose, thus making it necessary for the rail-
road to transport employee-witnesses great distances to the scene of
the trial. To alleviate the hardship placed on defendant railroads
by their normal amenability to suit in the many states in which they
were doing business, the state courts began enjoining plaintiffs from
prosecuting their actions in distant state forums.4
'April 22, 198o, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, 66.
-Judicial Code § 51, 36 Stat. 11oi (igii), 28 U. S. C. A. § 112 (1927): "...no
civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person by any original
process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant...."
z36 Stat. 291 (1910), as amended 36 Stat. 1167 (1911), 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45
U. S. C. A. § 56 (1943). Further amended, 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 45 U. S. C. A. § 56
(Supp. 1951).
'Kern v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N. E. 446 (1933);
Reed's Adm'x v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 182 Ky. 455, 206 S. W. 794, 798 (1918): "The
federal act does not, as we think, take away from the courts the power they possessed
before its enactment to restrain the plaintiff in a transitory suit from doing an
inequitable and unconscionable thing that would subject the defendant to great
and unnecessary cost and inconvenience."
For an example of the confusing results of having a state court enjoin further
prosecution of an F. E. L. A. suit in a distant federal court, see Bryant v. Atlantic
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Following the Supreme Court decision of Miles v. Illinois Central
Railroad Co.5 in 1942, in which it was held that a state court could
not enjoin a person under its jurisdiction from prosecuting an F.E.L.A.
action in another state court which also had jurisdiction of the cause
of action, it appeared that: (i) A state court could refuse to enter-
tain an F.E.L.A. suit under a "valid excuse." 6 (2) A federal district
court could not decline jurisdiction of an F.E.L.A. action.7 (3) A federal
district court would not enjoin a plaintiff from suing on an F.E.L.A.
cause of action in another federal district court.8 (4) A federal district
court could not enjoin a plaintiff from suing in a state court.9 (5) A
state court could not enjoin a plaintiff from prosecuting an F.E.L.A.
action in another state court.10 (6) A state court could not enjoin
a person from prosecuting an F.E.L.A. action in a distant federal
district court, under the rule of Baltimore - Ohio Rd. Co. v. Kepner.h"
As of 1942, therefore, it is evident that by federal court decisions the
191o amended version of the Federal Employer's Liability Act had
given plaintiffs, excepting in one situation, an absolute choice as to
forum of suit, venue requirements being met. The exception had
been created by the decision in Douglas v. New York, New Haven &
Coast Line R. Co., 92 F. (2d) 569 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). And for the usual holding that
a state court could not enjoin prosecution of an F. E. L. A. suit in a distant federal
court, see McConnell v. Thomson, 213 Ind. 6, 8 N. E. (2d) 986 (1q37), rehearing
denied, 213 Ind. x6, ii N. E. (2d) 183 (1937).
1315 U. S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 827, 86 L. ed. 1129 (1942).
6McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., 292 U. S. 230, 54 S. Ct. 69o,
78 L. ed. 1227 (1934); Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 279 U. S. 377, 387, 49
S. Ct. 355, 356, 73 L. ed. 747, 752 (1929): "...the Employers' Liability Act... does
not purport to require State Courts to entertain suits arising under it, but only
to empower them to do so.... It may very well be that if the Supreme Court of
of New York were given no discretion, being otherwise competent, it would be
subject to a duty. But there is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to
force a duty upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid excuse."; Second
Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 32 S. Ct. 169, 56 L. ed. 327 (19I1).
7Schendel v. McGee, 300 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Trapp v. Baltimore &
0. R. Co., 283 Fed. 655 (N. D. Ohio 1922); Connelly v. Central R. Co. of New
Jersey, 238 Fed. 932 (S. D. N. Y. 1916).
sChesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Vigor, go F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937); Southern
Ry. Co. v. Cochran, 56 F. (2d) io19 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932).
OSouthern Railway Co. v. Painter, 314 U. S. 155, 62 S. Ct. 154, 86 L. ed. 116
(1941); Judicial Code § 265, 36 Stat. 1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. 379 (1928): "The
writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay
proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be
authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy."
"Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 827, 86 L. ed.
1129 (1942).
1314 U. S. 44, 62 S. Ct. 6, 86 L. ed. 28 (1941).
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Hartford Railroad Company,12 which allowed a state "by judicial
decision or legislative enactment to regulate the use of its courts gen-
erally. .. ,"13 and accordingly to accept or refuse jurisdiction of
the case by means of a nondiscriminatory forum non conveniens
doctrine.14
Plaintiffs Choice of Forum construed To Be Absolute
In Union Pac. R. Co. v. Utterback,15 the Supreme Court of Oregon,
on the basis of the Miles case, properly refused to enjoin plaintiffs
from prosecuting an F.E.L.A. action in a" California state court for
damages for an accident which occurred in Oregon. The railroad then
resumed its fight in California by requesting the California court in
Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co.' 6 to refuse jurisdiction because of forum
non conveniens. The California court refused to do so saying: "What-
ever may have been the rule on the subject from time to time it is now
settled that the state court having jurisdiction may not refuse to ex-
ercise it."'1 The decision ignored the Douglas case, and also expressions
in the Miles case that the F.E.L.A. did not impose any absolute duty
on a state court to accept an F.E.L.A. case.' 8 The reasoning of the
California court was that since the injunction could no longer be used
to thwart a plaintiff from suing in a distant federal or state court
on an F.E.L.A. cause of action and because forum non conveniens was
not applied to an F.E.L.A. action brought in a federal court, therefore,
the state court where the same cause of action was being prosecuted
could not refuse jurisdiction because of forum non conveniens.
By denying certiorari, the United States Supreme Court refused
'279 U. S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. ed. 747 (1929).
'fMiles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698, 704, 62 S. Ct. 827, 831, 86
L. ed. 1129, 1134 (1942).
"For a more complete and exhaustive coverage of the problems discussed in
the foregoing section, see Note (1942) 3 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 247.
13173 Ore. 572, 146 P. (2d) 76 (1944).
125 Cal. (2d) 6o5, 155 P. (2d) 42 (1944).
"Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co., 25 Cal. (2d) 6o5, 155 P. (2d) 42, 44 (1944); Notes
(1945) 58 Harv. L. Rev. 877, (1945) 18 So. Cal. L. Rev. 281.
For cases holding a state court had to accept jurisdiction of an imported
F. E. L. A. cause of action, but which were decided before the Supreme Court
decision in the Douglas case, see Holmberg v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co., i88 Mich.
6o5, 155 N. W. 504 (1915); State ex rel. Schendel v. District Court of Lyon County,
156 Minn. 38o, 194 N. W. 780 (1923); Davis v. Minneapolis St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co.,
134 Minn. 455, 159 N. W. 1084 (1q6).
"Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698 at 704 and 7o8, 62 S. Ct.
827 at 831 and 832, 86 L. ed. 1129 at 1134 and 1136 (1942).
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to overthrow the decision. 19 The one remnant of restraint was there-
by removed, and a plaintiff now appeared to have an unqualified right
to bring his F.E.L.A. action and to have it tried in any court, state
or federal, where the venue provisions were complied with.
Forum Non Conveniens Made Applicable to F.E.L.A. Actions
Section 1404 (a) of Title 28, United States Code20 which became
effective on September 1, 1948, codified the doctrine of forum non
conveniens for the federal courts. While no statute was necessary to
give federal courts power to apply the doctrine, because it is a com-
mon law doctrine and may always be used in a proper case unless
explicitly denied a court by statute or decision,21 Section 1404 (a)
specifically gave the federal courts the authority to use forum non con-
veniens. One significant difference exists between the common law
version of forum non conveniens and this codified version; the common
law would require dismissal of the case, whereas the federal act
authorized transfer "to any other district or division where it might
have been brought."2
2
A split developed in the federal courts as to whether 1404 (a)
could be applied to F.E.L.A. actions. While most of those courts faced
with the problem held that it was applicable, 23 at least one court de-
cided that the special venue provision of the F.E.L.A. was st1perior to
1404 (a), and plaintiff's choice of forum would not be subordinated to a
forum non conveniens doctrine. 24 The United States Supreme Court
settled the issue in regard to the federal courts by its decision in
"Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Leet, 325 U. S. 866, 65 S. Ct. 1403, 89 L. ed.
1986 (1945).
""For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought." 62 Stat. 937 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1404 (a) (1950).
"Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law (1929)
29 Col. L. Rev. i: ".. new legislation is not needed ... for the doctrine in ques-
tion involves nothing more than an appeal to the inherent powers possessed by
every court of justice-powers, that is to say, which are incontestably necessary
to the effective performance of judicial functions."
-This has generally been held to mean that in a diversity suit the transfer has
to be to a district where jurisdiction could originally have been obtained over de-
fendant. Rogers v. Halford, 107 F. Supp. 295 (E. D. Wis. 1952).
2Scott v. New York Cent. R. Co., 81 F. Supp 815 (N. D. Ill. 1948); Nunn v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. P. & P. R. Co., 80 F. Supp. 745 ( S. D. N. Y. 1948); Hayes
v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 79 F. Supp. 821 (D. C. Minn. 1948).
2Pascarella v. New York Cent. R. Co., 81 F. Supp. 95 (E. D. N. Y. 1948).
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Ex Parte Collett,25 which held that an F.E.L.A. action was subject to
1404 (a) in spite of the special venue provision contained in the Act.
Under this decision, forum non conveniens could now be used in a
federal court, but under the Leet case, 26 forum non conveniens could
not be used in an F.E.L.A. action brought in a state court. Thus, by
1949 the situation had become just the reverse of what it had been
in 1942.
Although plaintiffs who sued in a federal forum at a very incon-
venient location could be remitted under 1404 (a) to a more conven-
ient federal forum to prosecute the suit, inasmuch as state courts were
now powerless to apply forum non conveniens and an F.E.L.A. action
brought in a state court could not be removed to a federal court,
27
plaintiffs could still not be disputed in their choice of forum as long
as they sued in a distant state court. By this obvious discrepancy the
bulk of F.E.L.A. litigation was thrown upon state courts of large
cities where the benefits of larger verdicts were thought to accrue. In
State ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield,2s a Missouri court in 1949
felt bound to accept jurisdiction of an F.E.L.A. action even though the
cause of action had arisen in Tennessee. On review of this case the
United States Supreme Court29 held that a state court could also apply
its local doctrine of forum non conveniens to F.E.L.A. actions, thereby
reestablishing the holding of Douglas v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad Company,30 which was cited in the case. However,
in subsequent proceedings, the Missouri Supreme Court held that
the courts of that state must try the case, because Missouri had no
forum non conveniens doctrine.31 As a result of the Mayfield decision,
the only place where plaintiff could not have his case subjected to
the forum non conveniens doctrine was in a state court not using the
doctrine. Such a situation was presented in Ex Parte State ex rel.
Southern Ry. Co.,32 in which the defendant railroad asked for a writ
337 U. S. 55, 69 S. Ct. 944, 93 L. ed. 1207 (1949).
-Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co., 25 Cal. (2d) 6o5, 155 P. (2d) 42 (1944).
T36 Stat. 291 (1910), as amended 36 Stat. 1167 (1911), 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45
U. S. C. A. § 56 (1943). Further amended, 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 45 U. S. C. A. § 56
(Supp. 1951).
'359 Mo. 827, 224 S. W. (2d) 105 (1949).
nMissouri ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. i, 71 S. Ct. 1,
95 L. ed. 3 (1950).
3'279 U. S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355, 73 L. ed. 747 (1929)-
31State ex rel. Southern Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 240 S. W. (2d) 106 (Mo. 1951).
a254 Ala. 1o, 47 S. (2d) 249 (1950).
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of mandamus requiring the Judge of the Tenth Judicial Circuit in
Alabama to decline jurisdiction and dismiss, on the grounds of forum
non conveniens, an F. E. L. A. action there pending against it. The
plaintiff in the Alabama suit was a resident of Georgia and the cause
of action arose in Georgia. The Alabama Supreme Court refused to
issue the writ, deeming all Alabama courts to be bound by a state
statute to take jurisdiction of all transitory actions brought in the
state courts.3 3 The statute was regarded as allowing no room for dis-
cretion to refuse to accept jurisdiction of the cause of action, because
"The wording [of the statute] is that the 'cause of action shall be
enforceable in the courts of this state,' and to read into the statute
the vesting of judicial discretion to accept or decline jurisdiction would
do violence to the language employed." 34
The Injunction Applied to F.E.L.A. Actions
There is very little difference between the effect of the application
of the forum non conveniens doctrine, and the issuance of the injunc-
tion against prosecuting the action-both devices are used to deter
the plaintiff from suing in locations which are inequitably incon-
venient to the defendant. In the injunction case, the court having
jurisdiction of the plaintiff will enjoin him, on defendant's petition,
from progecuting his action in another court. Under forum non con-
veniens, the court where the cause of action is brought, if a state
court, will dismiss the suit, and if a federal court, will transfer to
another federal court. Although the two devices have similar deterrent
effects, the problem remains whether they are interchangeable, so
that a court, not the court of the forum and hence without jurisdiction
-"Whenever, either by common law or the statutes of another state, a cause of
action, either upon contract, or in tort, has arisen in such other state against any
person or corporation, such cause of action shall be enforcible in the courts of this
state, in any county in which jurisdiction of the defendant can be legally obtained
in the same manner in which jurisdiction could have been obtained if the cause
of action had arisen in this state." Ala. Code (1940) Tit. 7, § 97.
In First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air Lines, Inc., 342 U. S. 396,
72 S. Ct. 421, 96 L. ed. 36o (1952), a statutory version of forum non conveniens
applicable to out-of-state wrongful death actions, prosecuted in Illinois, was held
invalid under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Except for the fact that an out-
of-state statute was in issue, it would seem to follow from this decision that
the Alabama statute would be the ultimate requirement needed and probably
preferred by the United States Supreme Court to fulfill the requirements of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution.
"Ex Parte State ex rel. Southern Ry. Co., 254 Ala. io, 47 S. (2d) 249, 250' (195o).
[Vol. X1
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to apply forum non conveniens, may nevertheless reach the same re-
sult by use of the injunction.
In the case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope,35 the Georgia
court was recently asked by petitioner railroad to enjoin Pope from
prosecuting his F.E.L.A. action in an Alabama state court. From even
a cursory examination of the facts of the case, it would seem that the
whole issue was foreclosed by Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.,3 6
which prohibited the courts of a state having jurisdiction of the
plaintiff in an F.E.L.A. action from issuing an injunction against
prosecution of the action in a state court of another state. Yet the
Georgia court issued the injunction. On an identical set of facts, how-
ever, the Florida Supreme Court, in Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.
Wood has recently held that it could not issue the injunction.
37
The confusion existing is aptly illustrated by the fact that in
the Florida case both appellant and appellee relied on 1404 (a), Ex
Parte Collett,38 and Missouri ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. May-
field.39 Moreover, in both the Florida and Georgia cases the two courts
considered exactly the same cases together with 1404 (a), and arrived
at differing conclusions. The critical point of difference between them
is whether 1404 (a) has or has not diminished plaintiff's initial choice
of venue given to him by 45 U.S.C. Section 56, and made absolute in him
by the Kepner, Miles, and Leet cases.
After discussing 1404 (a), and its applicability to F.E.L.A. actions
by reason of Ex Parte Collett, the Georgia court relied for its author-
ity to enjoin the plaintiff, on a statement in the concurring opinion of
Justice Jackson in the Mayfield case:
"The Missouri Court appears to have acted under the sup-
posed compulsion of Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U. S.
698, among other of this Court's decisions. The deciding vote in
that case rested, in turn, only on what seemed to be compulsion
of statutory provisions as to venue. By amendment, 28 U. S. C.
Section 1404 (a), as interpreted in Ex Parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55,
n209 Ga. 187, 71 S. E. (2d) 243 (1952).
0315 U. S. 698, 62 S. Ct. 827, 86 L. ed. 1129 (1942).
n5 8 S. (2d) 549, 551 (Fla. 1952): "The effort here is not only to resurrect and
apply an outmoded principle but to deprive the courts of a sovereign sister state of
the right under its own statute to entertain a suit rightfully begun and which it
may or may not retain in its discretion. Futhermore, to so hold would, though indi-
rectly, violate the rule of comity between the states."
337 U. S. 55, 69 S. Ct. 944, 93 L. ed. 1207 (1949).
034o U. S. 1, 71 S. Ct. 1, 95 L. ed. 3 (195o).
1953]
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Congress has removed the compulsion which determined the
Miles case, and the Missouri Court should no longer regard it
as controlling."
40
An almost identical statement is made by Justice Frankfurter in the
opinion of the Court: "Therefore, if the Supreme Court of Missouri
held as it did because it felt under compulsion of federal law as enun-
ciated by this Court so to hold, it should be relieved of that compul-
sion."41 In both instances the sentences following the quoted ones
resurrect the view of the Douglas case by stating that Missouri should
now be free to apply its own local law on forum non conveniens to an
F.E.L.A. action brought by a non resident in its courts. Two questions
are thereby raised by the Mayfield case: (i) What was the compulsion
that existed under the Miles case? (2) Was that compulsion removed
for all purposes, or only in relation to the forum court being able to
apply forum non conveniens to an F.E.L.A. action?
Mayfield Case Clarified Miles Case
The compulsion referred to in the Mayfield case as existing under
the Miles case was that plaintiff, by special statute given his choice of
forum in which to commence his action, could not be denied that
choice by an injunction issued against him by a state court having
jurisdiction over him. As the cause of action in an F.E.L.A. suit is
predicated on a federal statute, and concurrent jurisdiction is given to
state and federal courts to determine the issue, the United States
Supreme Court reasoned in the Miles case that because a plaintiff,
when bringing his F.E.L.A. action in a federal court, could not under
the Kepner case42 be enjoined from prosecuting it there, neither could
a plaintiff when bringing the same cause of action in a foreign state
court, be enjoined by the state court having jurisdiction over him.
In other words, the injunction could not be used to keep plaintiff in
an F.E.L.A. suit from initially bring his cause of action where he
chose to do so, venue provisions being met.
Taken out of its context, one sentence from the Miles case, which
was a suit for an injunction, might be taken to mean that a state
court also could not apply forum non conveniens to an F.E.L.A. action.
"0See concurring opinion, Missouri ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield,
340 U. S. 1, 5, 71 S. Ct. 1, 3, 95 L. ed. 3, 9 (195o).
"Missouri ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U. S. 1, 5, 71 S. Ct. I.
3, 95 L. ed. g, 8 (1950).
"Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Kepner, 314 U. S. 44, 62 S. Ct. 6, 86 L. ed.
28 (1941).
[Vol. X]
FEDERAL EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY ACT
That sentence is:"The Missouri court here involved [where the suit
was brought] must permit this litigation."43 Taken to mean that the
court having jurisdiction of the cause of action could not apply forum
non conveniens to the case, this assertion would be pure dicta. But this
sentence is qualified by a succeeding observation that Missouri, if it
were "To deny citizens from other states, suitors under F.E.L.A., access
to its courts would, if it permitted access to its own citizens, violate
the Privileges and Immunities Clause." 44 It seems evident, therefore,
that the first-quoted sentence was meant to refer to a violation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause,45 and not to forum non conveniens.
This interpretation is further substantiated by a direct denial in the
opinion of the Court that forum non conveniens was being considered.
46
Therefore, the removal by the Mayfield case of the compulsion of the
Miles case merely made it clear that the forum court was now able to
apply forum non conveniens to an F.E.L.A. action, but did not with-
draw from plaintiff the initial right to bring his action where he could
and where he chose to bring it.
Distinction Between Forum Non Conveniens and Injunction
Overlooked
In evaluating the decisions in this field, the courts have failed to
keep in mind whether the issues dealt with forum non conveniens or
with the injunctive remedy. From Justice Jackson's assertion in the
Mayfield case that "By amendment, 28 U. S. C. Section 1404 (a), as
interpreted in Ex Parte Collett... Congress has removed the compul-
sion which determined the Miles case... ,"47 the Georgia court in
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope,48 infers that a state court may now
again enjoin a person within its jurisdiction from prosecuting an
F.E.L.A. action in a state court of another state. This seems to be an
unwarranted assumption. It disregards the concluding portion of the
sentence which states: ".... and the Missouri Court should no longer
'Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698, 704, 62 S. Ct. 827, 88o, 86
L. ed. 1129, 1134 (1942).
"Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698, 704, 62 S. Ct. 827, 83o, 86
L. ed. 1129, 1134 (1942).
""The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immuni-
ties of Citizens in the several States." U. S. Const. Art. IV, § 2.
"Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698 at 704, 62 S. Ct. 827 at
831, 86 L. ed. 1129 at 1134 (1942).
"See concurring opinion, Missouri ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield,
340 U. S. 1, 5, 71 S. Ct. 1, 3, 95 L. ed. 3, 9 (195o).
29°o9 Ga. 187, 71 S. E. (2d) 243 (1952).
19531
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regard it as controlling."49 The Georgia court overlooks the fact that
the Missouri court was not regarding the Miles case as controlling on
the use of the injunction, but was erroneously regarding it as controll-
ing on the use of forum non conveniens. To have been explicit Justice
Jackson should simply have said: "The Missouri Court should not re-
gard the Miles case as controlling." The Miles case, a suit concerning
an injunction, never was controlling on the Missouri court where
forum non conveniens was the issue, but is still controlling on the
Georgia court where the injunction is again in issue.
Apparently not yet completely convinced that it may again use
the injunction, the Georgia court also reasoned along another line:
That because the plaintiff no longer has an unqualified right to have
his case tried where he brings it, he no longer has an inviolable right
to bring it where he chooses.5 0 The injunction and forum non con-
veniens issues are again not distinguished, but are made component
and necessary parts of the special venue privilege. If Justice Jackson
meant, as the Georgia court here concluded he did, that the plaintiff
in an F.E.L.A. action no longer has an inviolate initial right to bring
his action in any court where venue requirements are met, merely
because once he has brought it he may have it dismissed or transferred
by virtue of forum non conveniens, then Justice Jackson should not
have limited the effect of 1404 (a) by saying "Section 1404 (a), as in-
terpreted in Ex Parte Collett. .."51 He should rather have said that
because 1404 (a) punctured plaintiff's special choice of venue privilege
by denying him an absolute right to have his case tried where he
brought it, the special venue privilege is entirely deflated and he no
longer has an initial right to bring it where he chooses, venue pro-
visions being complied with. This is exactly what Ex Parte Collett
interprets 1404 (a) as not having done. Either inadvertently or pur-
"See note 47, Supra.
"Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope, 20o9 Ga. 187, 71 S. E. (2d) 243, 247 (1952):
"It being clear from the decisions in the Collett and Mayfield cases ... that the
courts in the State where transitory causes of action are pending have a right to
apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens, no sound reason exists why a court
of equity, where the employee resides and where the cause of action arose, having
jurisdiction of the parties, cannot, in a proper case, on equitable principles, re-
strain the employee from prosecuting his action under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act in a court of a foreign State."
It is interesting to note that the California court in the Leet case had reasoned
that because the injunction could not be used, it could not use forum non con-
veniens.
"See concurring opinion, Missouri ex rel. Southern Railway Co. v. Mayfield,
340 U. S. 1, 5, 71 S. Ct. 1, 3, 95 L. ed. 3, 9 (1950).
[Vol. X1
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posely, the Georgia court did not recognize the distinction made in
the Miles and Collett cases.
In Ex Parte Collett it was held that 28 U. S. C. Section 1404 (a)
applied to F.E.L.A. actions even though they were brought under a
special venue statute. But it is specifically stated that plaintiff's initial
right to bring his action where he can and chooses to do so is not af-
fected thereby.52 When Justice Jackson gave 1404 (a) the effect it was in-
terpreted to have under Ex Parte Collett, he recognized the distinction
made that the plaintiff in an F.E.L.A. action may still bring his case
where he chooses, venue requirements being fulfilled, but has no inviol-
able right to have it tried there. The effect seems dearly stated by Jus-
tice Rutledge in the concurring opinion, where he observed that "the
changes made in them [special venue causes of action] by 1404 (a) were
in the nature of repeals to the extent that the plaintiffs were deprived
of their rights under the pre-existing statutes to have their causes of ac-
tion tried in the forums where they were properly brought."5 3 The
Georgia court unjustifiably interpreted Justice Jackson as saying much
more.
Even though to the Georgia court no sound reason exists for not
being able to use an injunction where forum non conveniens can be
used, some reason for .distinguishing the two situations must have
been apparent to the United States Supreme Court. The Georgia
court apparently forgot that a federally created cause of action was in
issue, and that the state court is bound to follow interpretations already
made by the United States Supreme Court, and not to make its own.
Perhaps the soundest reason why plaintiff in an F.E.L.A. action has
an inviolable right to bring his action wherever he chooses, venue
requirements being complied with, is that given by Justice Jackson
when he called the F.E.L.A. a medieval system of recompense for in-
r-Ex parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 60, 69 S. Ct. 944, 947, 93 L. ed. 1207, 1211 (1949):
"Section 6 of the Liability Act defines the proper forum; § 1404 (a) of the Code deals
with the right to transfer an action properly brought. The two sections deal with
two separate and distinct problems. Section 1404 (a) does not limit or otherwise
modify any right granted in § 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to bring suit
in a particular district. An action may still be brought in any court, state or federal,
in which it might have been brought previously. The Code, therefore, does not
repeal § 6 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act .... We cannot agree that the
order before us [to transfer an F. E. L. A. case to another federal court because
of forum non conveniens] effectuates an implied repeal .... Discussion of the law of
implied repeals is, therefore, irrelevant."
13See concurring opinion, Ex Parte Collett, 337 U. S. 55, 73, 69 S. Ct. 944, 959, 93
L. ed. 1207, 12x8 (1949).
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juries received, allowing a lawsuit instead of a remedy, burdening
interstate commerce with two dollars of judgment for every dollar
the injured person receives, and concluded:
"I see no reason to believe that Congress could not have
intended the relatively minor additional burden to interstate
commerce from loading the dice a little in the favor of the
workman in the matter of venue. It seems more probable that
Congress intended to give the disadvantaged workman some
leverage in the choice of venue, than that it intended to leave
him in a position where the railroad could force him to try one
lawsuit at home to find out whether he could be allowed to
try his principal lawsuit elsewhere."
54
Forum Non Conveniens a Prerogative of the Forum Court
The doctrine of forum non conveniens involves determinations
which can only be made by the court of the forum.55 And it is im-
material in this connection whether the forum empowers its courts to
employ the doctrine. It does not follow as the Georgia court in the
Pope case supposed that because the Alabama courts do not apply
forum non conveniens, a Georgia court may enjoin a plaintiff sub-
ject to its jurisdiction from prosecuting the action in an Alabama
court. This point is even more significant where a federally created
right is in issue as in the Pope case, than where a state created right
is being litigated.
In Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. it was stated:
5'See concurring opinion, Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698,
707, 62 S. Ct. 827, 832, 86 L. ed. 1129, 1136 (1942).
5Tivoli Realty, Inc. v. Interstate Circuit, Inc., 167 F. (2d) 155, 156 (C.A.A. 5 th,
1948): "Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens a court having jurisdiction
may decline to exercise it in a suit that in justice should be tried elsewhere. This
doctrine involves the use of discretion on the part of the court in which the suit is
brought." Note (1945) 158 A. L. R. 1022, 1O31: "The doctrine of forum non con-
veniens deals with the discretionary power of a court to decline to exercise a
possessed jurisdiction whenever, because of the foreign elements involved in the
cause of action before the court, it appears that the controversy may be more
suitably tried elsewhere."
The Georgia court also draws attention to the fact that counsel for plaintiff
had instituted ten suits against defendant railroad in twenty-four months in Ala-
bama, nine of which arose outside that state. However, this is a matter for cor-
rection by the Alabama legislature or courts. In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v.
Andrews, 338 Ill. App. 552, 88 N. E. (2d) 364 (1949), defendant attorney was en-
joined from futher prosecuting F. E. L. A. cases in the Superior Court of Cook
County, Illinois. He secured these cases by means of a regular agency, and the
cause of action often occurred far distant from Illinois.
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"Even if Missouri, by reason of its control of its own courts
might refuse to open them to such a case [F.E.L.A. action, cause
of action occurring outside the state], it does not follow that
another state may close Missouri's courts to one with a federal
cause of action. If Missouri elects to entertain the case, the
courts of no other state can obstruct or prevent its exercise of
jurisdiction as conferred by the federal statute ... "56
The Georgia court is in effect making all F.E.L.A. actions arising
in Georgia and sued on where it is deemed to be inconvenient to the
defendant, local Georgia actions. This result is in conflict with the
reasoning of Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company v. George.57
In that case a suit based on an Alabama statute was instituted in
Georgia. The defense was that Alabama had by another statute de-
creed that all actions based on the statute had to be tried in Alabama,
and litigating the action in Georgia would violate the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution.58 The United States Supreme Court
held:
"...a State cannot create a transitory cause of action and at
the same time destroy the right to sue on that transitory cause of
action in any court having jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is to
be determined by the law of the court's creation and cannot be
defeated by the extra-territorial operation of a statute of another
State, even though it created the right of action."59
If a state may not make its own statutory cause of action a local action
it would seem impossible for a state court to make a federally created
cause of action a local action, and the Georgia court could not by
the use of the injunction keep plaintiff from prosecuting his action
in Alabama.
Power To Use, Plus a ProPer Case, a Necessity for the, Use of
the Injunction
The Georgia court in the Pope case based the power of the outside
state court to enjoin the plaintiff in an F.E.L.A. action from proceed-
ing in the inconvenient state forum largely upon the power of a forum
court to decline jurisdiction on the basis of forum non conveniens.
This would seem to be erroneous reasoning, yet the Georgia court
r'See concurring opinion, Miles v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 315 U. S. 698,
708, 62 S. Ct. 827, 8,2, 86 L. ed. 1129, 1136 (1942).
G'233 U. S. 154, 34 S. Ct. 587, 58 L. ed. 997 (1914).
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State." U. S. Const. Art. IV, § i.
5Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 36o, 34
S. Ct. 587, 589, 58 L. ed. 997, 1000 (1914).
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assumed it has the power, and concluded: "At least for the present,
the views of the minority in the Miles and Kepner cases are the views
of the majority in Ex Parte Collett and Southern Railway Co. v. May-
field... We are bound by controlling decisions of the United States
Supreme Court as of today. Sufficient unto the day is the decision
thereof."60 It is submitted that by allowing forum non conveniens to be
applied to F.E.L.A. cases, the United States Supreme Court did not
overrule the Miles and Kepner cases pertaining to injunctions, and
that all four cases in their own proper spheres are still authoritative.
The Georgia court is bound by the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court on this federally created cause of action, and the
Miles case is authority for an opposite conclusion than that at which
the Georgia court arrived.
Having concluded that it had the power to use the injunction, the
Georgia court then studied the facts and found from them that there
was also a proper case for issuing the injunction. It was determined
that plaintiff had secured an "inequitable and unconscionable"
advantage over the defendant by bringing the suit 313 miles distant
from where the cause of action accrued, thereby causing defendant
great expense and inconvenience in transporting the necessary witnesses
to the trial. Another reason given for why there was a proper case for
invoking the injunction was that: "In selecting a State court of Ala-
bama, the employee [plaintiff] has.., denied to the employer [de-
fendant railroad] the equitable right of invoking the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, which it would have had if the action had been
brought in a Federal court of that State." 61 This reasoning could only
be upheld if it were shown that Alabama, because of its statute which
denied any Alabama court the right to reject jurisdiction of a trans-
itory cause of action because of forum non conveniens, had forced
defendant to defend in the Alabama courts, and had thereby given
him an inadequate remedy at law. Such has not been shown, nor
can it be assumed that any state will not give a citizen of another state
a just and fair trial in its courts. Furthermore, if forum non conveniens
is regarded as substantive law, and a denial of it is viewed as an in-
adequate remedy at law, then the Alabama statute would be sub-
stantive, and the injunction of the Georgia court would be invalid
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. If there was a proper case
for issuing the injunction, it would have to rest on the distance of
'0Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope, 209 Ga. 187, 71 S. E. (2d) 243, 247 (1952).
"Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope, 209 Ga. 187, 71 S. E. (2d) 243, 248 (1952).
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travel, expense, and inconvenience forced on defendant by having
to defend in Alabama. No rules can be set as to whefil there is, or
when there is not a just case for invoking the injunction. Each case
must rest on its own facts and the trial court by the exercise of a sound
discretion must determine if there is sufficient justification for the
injunction.
62
Supreme Court Reaffirms the Miles Case
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Pope
case, because the Georgia court interpreted a federal statute, and did
so in a manner seemingly repugnant to prior interpretation by the
Supreme Court.63 In holding, in its decision announced on April 27,
1953,
6
4 that the Georgia court could not issue the injunction, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Miles case, which had previously held
that a state court could not enjoin a person within its jurisdiction
from prosecuting an F.E.L.A. action in a distant state court where
venue requirements were also fulfilled. In the opinion of the majority,
Chief Justice Vinson declared:
"Congress has deliberately chosen to give petitioner a trans-
itory cause of action; and we have held before, in a case indis-
tinguishable from this one, that Section 6 displaced the tradi-
tional 'power of a state court to enjoin its citizens, on the ground
of oppressiveness ... from suing ... in the courts of another
state.... .' Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., . .. 315 U. S. at 699."65
It was denied that there was any implied repeal of the Miles case in
28 U. S. C. A. Section 1404 (a), which gave federal courts permission
to use forum non conveniens, and which by the Collett case was made
'Note (1933) 85 A. L. R. 1351: "No general rule can be laid down as to when
the court ought to enjoin a party from prosecuting a suit in a foreign jurisdiction.
Each case must be governed by its own facts. If they show that it is necessary and
equitable to exercise the power in the orderly administration of justice, the in-
junction will issue; otherwise not."
c-62 Stat. 929 (1948), 28 U. S. C. A. § 1257 (1949): "Final judgments or decrees
rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court as follows:
(3) By writ of certiorari .... where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is
specially set up or claimed under the Constitution, treaties or statutes of, or com-
mission held or authority exercised under, the United States."
Some time was spent to determine whether the decision by the Georgia Su-
preme Court was such a final decision as 28 U. S. C. A. § 1257 requires before the
United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a state court decision. This
was determined in the affirmative.
'APope v. Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co., 73 S. Ct. 749, 97 L. ed. 719 (1953).
'-Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co., 73 S. Ct. 749, 751, 97 L. ed. 719, 722 "1953).
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applicable to F.E.L.A. actions brought in federal courts. It is asserted
that 1404 (a) applies only to federal courts, and then only to federal
courts where the suit is being prosecuted; that 1404 (a) has no effect
on any state court, and contains no provision concerning an injunc-
tion.
66
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, reasoned that by the passage of
1404 (a) ".. . Congress has cut the ground from under. . ."7 the Miles
and Kepner cases. However, he apparently relied too heavily on the
reviser's notes to Section 1404s as support for his view, and overlooked
the portions of the Collett case which specifically stated that the Miles
and Kepner cases were undisturbed by 1404 (a).69
The F.E.L.A. in Retrospect
Had the contention of Justice Frankfurter and the Georgia court
prevailed, the injured railroad employee would have been in the
most disadvantageous position since amendments to the F.E.L.A. in
191o and 1911 gave him the choice of three forums in which to sue.
Even though in the early years of the Act plaintiff could be enjoined
by the state court of his residence, and though a distant state court
could reject jurisdiction, a distant federal court could be made the
forum court, and it would accept the case. The plaintiff's position
gradually became stronger, and after the Kepner, Miles and Utterback
"73 S. Ct. 749 at 752, 97 L. ed. 719 at 722 (1953).
6-See Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co., 73 S. Ct. 749, 754, 97 L. ed. 719, 724
('953)-
18In the reviser's note to 1404 this statement is made: "Subsection (a) was
drafted in accordance with the doctrine of forum non conveniens, permitting
transfer to a more convenient forum, even though the venue is proper. As an ex-
ample of the need of such a provision, see Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner...."
H. R. Rep. No. 3o8, 8oth Cong. 1st Sess. A. 132 (1947).
In the opinion of the Court, this reviser's note was interpreted to mean that
the inequity of the result of the ruling in the Kepner case would be alleviated by
1404 (a), but that the decision itself is undisturbed; that the power of the federal
court to transfer was the reference, and not of a state court to enjoin. Pope v.
Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co., 73 S. Ct. 749 at 752, 97 L. ed. 719 at 723 (1953).
Justice Frankfurter, on the other hand, interpreted the note to mean that by
1404 (a) Congress has changed the ruling of the Kepner case, and that henceforth the
plaintiff in an F. E. L. A. action could again be enjoined by a state court of his
residence from prosecuting his F. E. L. A. action in a distant state court. See Pope
v. Atlantic Coast Line Rd. Co., 73 S. Ct. 749 at 754, 755, 97 L. ed. 719 at 725 (1953).
The differences in interpretation seem to be academic, and after all it is the
statute not the reviser's note that is in issue, and the statute concerns forum non con-
veniens, not the injunction. Justice Frankfurter, as others have done, has made
forum non conveniens and the injunction correlatives, which they are not.
"See note 52, supra.
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cases he enjoyed a temporary absolute right to bring his case and to
have it tried in the forum of his choice, state or federal, wherever
venue requirements were met.
A retrogression was made when, by the Collett case, 1404 (a) was
made applicable to F.E.L.A. actions brought in a federal court. Plain-
tiff's choice of federal forum was no longer absolute. Another backward
step was made by the Mayfield case. By it forum non conveniens could
be applied by a state court when the state court was made the forum
for an F.E.L.A. action. Plaintiff's choice of forum was then secure
only when a state court that was not able to apply forum non con-
veniens to any cases by its local law, was made the forum court. If
the injunction could now be used when the action was being prose-
cuted in the distant state court where forum non conveniens was not
in practice, then plaintiff would have no courts other than the state or
federal court in his immediate vicinity in which he could bring his
action and not have to prove his right outside the statute to prose-
cute it there--this, in spite of the fact that the basic statute gave an
injured railroad employee three places in which to sue, and never qual-
ified his right to sue in any one of them.70
As the cases now stand, an injured railroad employee may bring
his suit in a distant state or federal court, and the state court of his
residence cannot enjoin him from doing so. Both the federal and state
court may view the case in the light of forum non conveniens, and
are not required to hear the case. But if the state court, which is the
7'Attempts and suggestions have been made to alter the effect of the venue
provision of the F. E. L. A. Railroad employers have attempted by contractual
arrangement with the employee to delimit the place of suing in case a suit should
arise. While earlier decisions have varied, by Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western Rd.
Co., 338 U. S. 263, 70 S. Ct. 26, 94 L. ed. 55 (1949), the Supreme Court seems to
have now determined that such contracts are invalid under 5 Stat. 66 (19o8), 45
U. S. C. A. § 55 (1943) voiding any contract by which the carrier attempts to exempt
itself from liability under the Act. In 1947 the Jennings Bill, H. R. 1639, 8o Cong.,
1st Sess. (1947), was discussed in Congress, but was never enacted. By it venue
would have been limited to plaintiff's place of residence or where the injury oc-
curred, and only if defendant could not there be served, could suit be had in any
other place where defendant railroad could be served. New legislation has been
urged repeatedly. What has retarded it, and will continue to do so, is lack of any
consensus as to what it should embody. It has been suggested that the suits be heard
only in federal courts, or that transfer from the state court to the federal court
be allowed generally, or at least when the case is an imposition on the defendant,
and is brought in a distant state court. Note (1950) 3 Ala. L. Rev. 192 at 2oo.
Another suggestion is to abolish the F. E. L. A. entirely, and to set up a work-
men's compensation for injured railroad employees. Note (1952) 3o N. C. L. Rev. 68.
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forum court, does not have the principle of forum non conveniens
available for its use, then it must try the case.
71
7Justice Frankfurter points out what might seem to be an anomolous situation
as the decisions now stand, in that the F. E. L. A. is a federal cause of action, yet
federal courts are able to transfer by 1404 (a), but state courts cannot. The result
is not as illogical as Justice Frankfurter seems to view it. A federal court only
transfers to another federal court, while a state court can dismiss because of forum
non conveniens. Of course, a state court not allowed to use forum non conveniens,
is currently required to try the case. Yet a non-discriminatory forum non con-
veniens statute may be passed by those states not now using it. While Justice
Frankfurter states that it is the exceptional state court which does not use forum
non conveniens [See 73 S. Ct. 749, 756, 97 L. ed. 719, 727 (1953)], it seems that the
exception is the other way. Few states have it. Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum non
Conveniens (1947) 35 Calif. L. Rev. 380, 388; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (3d ed.
1949) 22.
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